Immigration policy remains one of the most divisive issues on the American political landscape. While policymakers have legislated a policy that reflects the benefits of open borders to goods and services, they have forestalled a similar policy toward the movement of peoples. This divergence, that is, open borders for goods but closed borders for people, is a puzzle from a purely materialist perspective.
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effects; thus, opinions on one flow should be similar to opinions on the other.
This economic logic, however, is rarely articulated in political circles. Although the issue of competition in the labor market has been part of the public policy discussion, the economic rationale for open immigration receives much less attention than does the defense of free trade. Analysts of immigration policy suggest that the absence of an economic defense for open immigration reflects a set of noneconomic factors, most often nativism or cultural bias, in the voting public. But as well, analysts themselves could be criticized for having over focused on noneconomic attitudes, drawing attention away from the economic basis for immigration attitudes and/or how cultural bias interacts with material interests.
To address this lacuna, we took advantage of a survey experiment conducted during an exogenous shock-the Great Recession. Using trade attitudes as a baseline, we examine the degree of change in attitudes on immigration as a result of economic hard times and how changes in an individual's economic circumstance interact with noneconomic views on immigrants and immigration policy. In 2007, before the downturn, over 6,000 Americans participated in a national survey on immigration and trade attitudes. We returned to these individuals five further times during and postrecession, again asking them questions about immigration and trade. Uniquely, we asked them to report both their current salaries and the subjective assessment of their economic well-being, allowing an assessment of how either or both objective and subjective perceptions of the economy can influence attitudes on open borders.
To preview our results, we find that respondents have a baseline preference for high-skill immigrants over low-skill immigrants, but both these opinions varied over the recession cycle. In terms of the puzzle we pose, attitudes are consistent with economic logic for high-skill immigrants. Consistent with trade attitudes, high-skill Americans who felt particularly financially threatened during the Great Recession increased their opposition to high-skill immigrants, while others had more benign attitudes. The area of greatest divergence from the trade baseline was low-skill immigration policy. Here, even controlling for economic circumstance, we find a more nativist response. Yet as we expected, perceptions of the recession affected attitudes; those who felt more personally threatened by the recession were more likely to be against low-skill immigration as well.
Our findings suggest new conjectures on the differences between aspects of globalization and the source of opposition to a more open immigration policy. We find that many respondents have internalized the economic idea that free trade is good but not that immigration is equally good for themselves and/or the nation. While we find that cultural bias interacts with an individual's economic position predicting baseline views on immigration, the economic recession increased the salience of the economic component of attitudes.
We organize our article as follows. First, we conduct a short literature review to set the context of the study. Second, we introduce the survey and the descriptive data on responses. Third, we look at the results of our study to examine first, the extent to which these trade and immigration attitudes have a common basis, and second, in more detail, how attitudes on immigration change due to economic hard times. We conclude with some general findings on trade, immigration, and globalization.
WHY OPEN BORDERS TO TRADE AND CLOSED BORDERS TO PEOPLE?
Research on public attitudes on trade and immigration has occurred on parallel and occasionally overlapping tracks. Most scholarship starts from the view that, from a labor market perspective, respondents should hold similar views about trade and immigration. As Paul Samuelson (1948) argued, open (closed) trade and open (closed) immigration will have the same effects on real wages, increasing the wages of the abundant (scarce) factor and decreasing the wages to the scarce (abundant) factor. Thus if economic variables influence attitudes, and we know the economic circumstance of the individuals, we should expect parallel responses on our questions about trade and immigration. In the United States and other wealthy countries, this model predicts that low-skill workers would oppose trade and immigration because most trade is in goods that compete with the products they produce, and most immigrants compete for their jobs. In contrast, high-skill workers "should" favor generally more openness to trade and immigration since the policy, in theory, should increase their wages. Scant data, however, support this conjecture. A number of reasons have been suggested for this divergence. Some analysts have argued that sectors, and not skill, are better predictors of preferences, suggesting that respondents who work in industries directly threatened (helped) by trade and immigration will oppose (favor) openness. welfare system; traded goods do not and further, at least in the case of the United States, even when trade policy leads to layoffs, these layoffs have a far smaller fiscal effect, being constrained by trade adjustment assistance legislation. By this logic, respondents may be worried that an increase of immigrants, especially low-skill immigrants, will lead to an increase in taxation to pay for the expanded use of the social welfare system and/or crowd out their own use of these services.
Other scholars have argued that individual-based economic arguments fail, not because of any materialist concerns, but because individuals vary on the fundamental value of tolerance (see Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2011; Harell et al. 2012) . For some, immigration increases the threat of changes to the national culture and/or competition over scarce resources. Testing skill-based versus tolerance-based explanations, however, has been difficult in the past because scholars rely on the same proxy, education, as a measure of their explanatory variable, whether that is skill or tolerance (see Hiscox 2006, 2010) . In two innovative studies attempting to separate the two possible causes, Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox looked at whether attitudes varied by employment status (2006) or skill level of immigrants (2010) and found that educated respondents held more positive attitudes to trade and high-skilled immigration, even if they were not in the workforce. If driven exclusively by job concerns, we would expect that those out of the workforce would not respond to trade questions in the same manner as those employed in the labor force and that high-skill natives would not favor high-skill immigration.
Finally, a group of scholars has argued that opinions on both trade and immigration are based on sociotropic concerns, i.e., concerns about how trade and immigration affect the nation as a whole (see Citrin et al. 1997; Mansfield and Mutz 2009) . They find that opinions of how trade (immigration) affects the nation drive opinions on trade (immigration) policy and that opinions of the well-being of the national economy affect opinions on both issue areas. It is less clear from these studies, however, just how opinions about the effects of trade and immigration on the nation are formed and how this interacts with the effects of these policies (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012) . If perceptions about the national economy are driving opinion, why is there such a large gap between opinions on trade and immigration in economic hard times? Would they not move in tandem?
To better understand if and why the economic environment influences trade and immigration attitudes, we utilize our panel data to test a number of these arguments. In particular, first, arguments based on skill level would predict that natives oppose immigration of similarly skilled immigrants more in times of economic crisis. In good times, labor market concerns should be less salient. Second, following Rafaela Dancygier and Michael Donnelly (2013) , economic hard times should make industry cleavages more prevalent. Further, the fiscal exposure model predicts that a recession leads to a change in opinion of both high-and low-skill natives toward immigration, with a more favorable attitude toward high-skill immigration, since they contribute more to the fiscal system and use fewer social services. Fourth, if sociotropic views drive policy, we expect that those who think the US economy has declined the most should drive increases in anti-immigrant sentiment. Finally, nativism should increase with economic hard times, although the mechanism is less clear. It could be the case that hard times increase competition between groups and makes nativism more salient. If so, and if education inculcates tolerance, low-skill respondents should increase their opposition to both low-and high-skill immigration to a greater degree than do high-skill respondents.
Our prior belief is that financial strain as well as subjective perception of economic threat affects opinions on immigration. We believe that even unsophisticated survey respondents understand the economic effects of the downturn, even if they are not directly hurt by it. Economic hard times increase general levels of anxiety about the nation and about their job prospects, leading to opposition to what is seen as economic threats. We are not the first to argue that perception of threat affects opinions on immigration; Paul Sniderman, Loul Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior (2004) find that self-assessed economic threats as well as self-assessed cultural threats affect immigration opinions and that these threats are not necessarily tied to anything objective. Where our study differs is that instead of using a survey experiment to determine self-assessed threat, we examine how an actual economic threat-a major recession-changes opinion.
RESPONSES TO THE GREAT RECESSION
The following analysis is based on data from six waves of a Web survey fielded by the survey firm YouGov/Polimetrix between 2007 and 2012. The 2007 survey began with 6,357 respondents, but not all of them responded to each survey wave. To increase the sample size of each wave, new respondents were included; some of these respondents were resampled as well to make up for attrition of previous panel members. 3 The survey design thus consists of both repeated cross-sections and a panel. Respondents were asked about a range of issues related to their economic well-being, their workplace, and their views on different policy issues, including trade and immigration.
In contrast to most studies, respondents were randomized to see a question on either low-or high-skill immigrants and asked their views on immigration from different geographic areas as opposed to forcing respondents to impute a skill level to the immigrants in question. 4 The skill level of the immigrant was randomized to be low or high.
Respondents were also asked about a number of specific countries: In 2007-2009, they were asked about Chinese, Indian, Mexican, and "European Immigration." In 2010-2012, we included Canada, Germany, and Romania as well. The inclusion of Canada and Germany allow us to examine two groups of high-skill immigrants where one is slightly more culturally similar, and the inclusion of Romania allows us to examine opinion toward lower-skilled (although not low-skill) Europeans. Both the order of the countries presented as well as the overall question order was randomized to ensure that responses were not driven by the priming effect of previous questions.
Our question on trade also differs from the question used by many other scholars in that we do not add any information to the question, which Michael Hiscox (2006) has argued adds an undue framing to the question. In addition to asking respondents their preferences on immigration and trade, we also asked respondents several questions on their feelings on culture and international economic activity, their own job and economic security, and their perception of the economic security of their community and the country overall.
Aggregate Findings
In our 2007 cross-section baseline, more than two-thirds of respondents believed that trade had been good for their family, and almost 50% wanted to limit trade. Instead of seeing this as a contradictory finding, this difference may be a signal that a significant number of people think that "trade" is about more than just their individual circumstance. This is consistent with our finding of variation in trade with particular countries. Most respondents believed that trade restrictions with Europe would be somewhat bad, restrictions with India and Mexico would be neither bad nor good, and restrictions with China would be somewhat good.
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In the initial survey, respondents largely opposed immigration, but opposition varied by the skill level and country of origin of the immigrant. Almost two-thirds thought that immigration of low-skill workers was problematic; immigration of high-skill workers elicited the opposite reaction, with almost two-thirds of respondents saying that it was good. As to place of origin, immigration from Mexico was opposed most, whereas immigration from Europe was the most popular; immigration from China and India fell in between.
6 In terms of the economic perceptions of our panel, in 2007, prerecession, two-thirds of our respondents did not think that it would be difficult to find a job that paid as well or better than their current job.
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The following results we report are based on changes in attitudes of this group, focusing only on respondents who answered our immigration question in at least two consecutive years. The panel, therefore, is unbalanced although very similar to the repeated cross-sections and the US population as a whole. There are three statistically significant differences between the repeated cross-sections and the panel: There are more men in the panel than in the repeated cross-section; there are fewer non-Hispanic minorities, and the panel participants are older (see online Appendix Table A1 ). We control for these factors even though we find little effect of most of these demographic variables.
Longitudinal Findings
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of answers to our most general query on support for open borders, first in immigration, separated by high-and lowskill migrants, and then in trade. Even at this level of aggregation, we see that opposition to high-skill immigrants increased dramatically during the recession. Low-skill immigrants, always unpopular, became even more problematic; trade policy, however, moved in the opposite direction, becoming more and not less favored. Once the recovery began, respondents decreased their opposition to all immigrants and by 2012 increased their support beyond the 2007 levels.
8 Oddly, trade continued to gain support throughout this time period. The differences are significant within each domain and vastly different across these policies.
In Figure 2 , the data in Figure 1 are organized by country of origin. The differences here exist throughout our study. Mexicans are much more disliked than Indians and Chinese, and all are more disliked than Europeans. Some of this difference is likely cultural, but we find that country is a good proxy for average skill level: Mexican immigrants, on average, have a low level of skills, Chinese have a moderate level, and European and Indian immigrants have a high level of skill. Therefore, respondents could be imputing skill levels to these groups, although that would make the data on Indians an outlier. As in Figure 1 , opposition to immigration increased in 2008 and 2009 and decreased once the recovery began in 2010. Opposition to high-skilled migrants, somewhat unexpectedly, increased more than did opposition to low-skill migrants (a 7.39-point increase versus a 3.76-point increase). As a result, opposition to European immigration increased more than did opposition to Indian and Chinese immigration (a 6.36-point increase versus a 1.16-and 1.78-point increase respectively) and Mexican immigration (a 4.48-point increase).
ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS AND ECONOMIC REALITY
We focus on both the cross-section and over-time analysis of attitudes, based on two sets of measures of economic position. The first is a composite of responses on perceptions of the economy, including perceptions of their economic circumstance, that of their friends and coworkers and the national economy. 9 The second is a direct question on income. Our assumption was that respondents would vary over the course of the recession on objective measures, on how the economic crisis directly affected their lives, and how they perceived the crisis was affecting others. As we show in the following, our perception composite has greater explanatory power than does change in self-reported income. In fact, we found significant divergences between "objective" changes in income as well as changes in the real economy, even those changes measured at the county level, and "subjective" perceptions of how well the respondent was doing. Table 1 presents our findings on the relationship between objective changes in income and subjective perceptions of economic circumstance. 10 We expect that changes in income should lead, in tandem, to changes in perception. This is not what we find. While those with increased income are least likely to report a negative change in our perception variables, and those with a decrease in income most likely to report a negative change in perception, these differences are rarely statistically significant. The only answer in which income predicted perception was on our question about the probability of finding a new job, if necessary. This lack of congruence may reflect error by respondents on estimating their income, even within these categories, or it could be that their economic perception is driven more by the economic situation in their industry within their state, in their community, or in the country as a whole. Tables 2 and 3 present this alternative. Each table shows an ordered probit of changes in our questions on economic perception of changes in variables that measure the real economy. Negative changes in perception take the value -1, no changes in perception take the value 0, and positive changes take the value 1. The first two measures examine the economy in the county where respondents live.
11 The next measure examines the housing market in the state where the respondent lives. Because of the lack of comparable, open-source data on foreclosures and home prices in all geographic regions, we examine housing starts (US Census Bureau 2013a). 12 We assume that an increase in the number of housing starts signals rising home prices, and a decrease signals falling home prices.
As well, we include measures of employment and wages in the respondent's industry in his/her state as well from the Country Business Profiles (US Census Bureau 2013b). 13 We use the change in the total number of workers to examine whether the industry is hiring or laying off workers and changes in mean wages to examine whether workers are getting raises or taking pay cuts. At the national level, we include year indicator variables. These variables capture national-level shocks to the economy that all respondents should feel in a given year. We also include partisanship along with the interaction of partisanship and an indicator for President Obama's term. 14 Other studies have found that partisans have worse perceptions of the economy when their party is not in office (Gerber and Huber 2010) . Finally, the standard battery of respondent-level controls is included.
We find some striking results. First, the analysis in both Tables 2 and  3 suggests that economic perceptions are little influenced by the objective measures of the economy in the country, state, industry, or country. 15 In an ordered probit regression, positive and significant explanatory variables mean that there is a greater probability that the dependent variable takes a higher value and a lower probability that it takes a lower value and vice versa. We would expect that increases in county employment, county per capita income, housing starts, industry employment (in the state), and industry wages (in the state) would lead to more positive economic perception, or that the coefficient of these variables should be positively signed and significant. But there are few statistically significant coefficients, and none of them is consistent across measures.
Some economic effects are evident. There is evidence that Independents and Republicans were more likely to have a negative change in economic perception than Democrats were and that their views on the economy were worse when Obama was in office. This is consistent with earlier survey results that found that perceptions of the economy were worse among those who identified with the party out of power.
Thus similar to Sniderman et al. (2004) , we conclude that at least during the Great Recession, the feeling of economic threat is not predicted by objective individual-level economic circumstance. They find it is tied to low self-esteem. We remain agnostic on its cause. But given these findings, we abandon our self-reported income and other objective measures of the effect of the recession and turn instead to responses to questions on perception of the economy in order to better capture variation in opinion.
EXPLAINING CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
We begin by examining the level of support for immigration. We find, as in the Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) study, little evidence for either skill level or fiscal effect as a determinant of the level of attitudes. High-skill respondents were less anti-immigrant than were low-skill respondents regardless of the category of immigrants. Fiscal exposure had little effect on opinions on immigration (see online Appendix Tables A6 and A7). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) concluded that nativism, related to years of education, was driving these results. Their conclusion, however, does not stand when we look at changes in attitudes.
When viewed over time, neither nativism nor other noneconomic-based prejudices are predictors of changes in attitudes during economic hard times. If immigration attitudes were driven by long-held noneconomic prejudice, such as nativism, we would not expect the change in attitudes we find as the economy declined; noneconomic prejudice should remain a constant. What we see is that economic decline affects both support for immigration and support for government protection of the national culture (see online Appendix Figure A1 ): The worsening of the recession leads to higher levels of nativism, while the recovery leads to less. Further, given earlier research, we do not believe that nativism can explain the shift of opinions by high-skill respondents to high-skill immigrants: High-skill respondents have been shown to be more tolerant of immigrants in general and especially of high-skill immigrants. Yet, the large increase in negative attitudes toward immigration comes from these high-skill individuals, and moreover, they are negative toward other high-skill workers. The simplest reason, ceterus paribus, is that hard economic times tightened the job market, and high-skill immigrants became a job threat. This was a rational and unsurprising shift in opinion, having nothing to do with cultural feelings (Figure 3) . Unlike earlier studies, we see this as strong evidence for an economic component to opinions on immigration.
This is not to say that nativism is not a powerful explanatory variable, and from other studies, we know that it varies across different groups of respondents. Hispanics and other minorities are often less anti-immigrant than are Whites; older respondents are thought to be more nativist and, therefore, more anti-immigrant. What our data clarify is that while this characterization may explain baseline preferences toward immigrants, nativism may not be helpful in explaining changes in opinion. Table 4 regresses the level of support for immigration and the year-overyear change in opinion on immigration on the standard battery of survey control variables. 17 We include an indicator for President Obama's term and interact it with partisanship. The level regressions are logit regressions in which negative opinions on immigration take the value 1, and positive and neutral opinions take the value 0. The change regressions are ordered probits on negative change, no change and positive change in opinion. 18 In an ordered probit, a negative and statistically significant coefficient increases the probability that a respondent will have a negative change in opinion, and a positive and statistically significant coefficient increases the probability that a respondent will have a positive change in opinion. The level regressions replicate what most of the public opinion literature has done-examining a single cross-section-but pool all of the repeated cross-sections. As many other scholars have found, respondents with more education, at least some college, are less anti-immigrant than those with less education; younger people are less anti-immigrant than older people, but this tapers off as respondents age; non-Whites and Hispanics are less ant-immigrant than Whites; Independents and Republicans are more antiimmigrant than Democrats; and Catholics and non-Christians are more pro-immigration than Mainline Protestants, whereas Evangelicals are more anti-immigrant. Further, we find that once Obama took office, Democrats became more pro-immigration, whereas Republicans became even more anti-immigrant.
But again, when we examine the change in opinions on immigration, we find that these demographic variables explain little of the variation; only the indicator for women is statistically significant for low-skill immigration. Why the gender difference? We know that the importance of female wages has been increasing over the last several decades, especially among lower-income households and that it increased even further during the recession, as husbands and fathers were laid off (what was often called the "Mancession"). This may translate into women perceiving low-skill immigrants as an increased threat, filling positions in traditionally female industries such as caregiving.
These results suggest that more immutable characteristics, such as ethnicity and race as well as education, are good baseline predictors of immigration attitudes but perform poorly when used to explain changes in support. In addition, it appears that the variable "age" may be a cohort effect and not an effect of aging: If aging causes respondents to become more anti-immigrant, we would have seen a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the age variable in the change regressions. Instead, we find little effect, suggesting that as a cohort, older voters are more antiimmigrant. 19 Finally, we find that partisanship alone and in combination with an opposition president, affected the level of support, but did not explain why individuals changed their opinions.
What, then, does explain changes in opinions on immigration? The data suggest that opinions are driven by perceptions of economic threat. These perceptions are not necessarily tied to any specific threat occurring in the real economy but instead, to the general threat to economic well-being felt during the Great Recession. These threats were felt on three levels: threats to the family and the family's income, threats to the community, and threats to the nation. Table 5 examines the effect of these threats on opinions on lowand high-skill immigration. Here we utilize the survey experiment to see how economic perception variables affect opinions on low-and high-skill immigration differently. We regress year-over-year changes in opinions on immigration by skill level, but we pool all responses. We include an indicator for whether the respondent saw the low-skill or high-skill immigration questions two years in a row and interact the high-skill indicator with our explanatory variables in a nested model. The nested model allows us to test if the effects of our explanatory variables affect responses to low-skill and high-skill immigration differently. Because we randomized who saw the low-skill and high-skill question, any differences in the response should be based on the skill of the immigrant and not on a characteristic of the respondent.
Using the change in support for immigration rather than the level of support allows us to examine within-respondent changes in support for immigration. Additionally, it may decrease the level of social desirability bias. It is unlikely that the social desirability of appearing pro-immigrant has changed greatly over the last six years.
To assess changes over time, we include variables that measure changes in the perception of the economic situation on the family, the community, and the nation (no change is always the excluded category). We found that the question of family's income six months from now, the question of whether the respondent's friends were struggling, and satisfaction with the overall economy provided the most explanatory power and only include these variables. 20 We include year indicators to see if national-level changes have additional explanatory power (2008 is the excluded category). As a robustness check, we examined objective changes in the economy at state-, county-, and industry-level data and found little effect of these variables (See online Appendix Table A5 ). The result that objective measures of economic threat did not lead to changes in opinion on immigration is consistent with previous research. Margalit (2013) , using the same survey data, similarly found that objective measures of the economy could explain little of the change in views on welfare.
We have also set up our data analyses so as to examine alternative hypotheses. We include measures of education to examine arguments based on the skill level of natives and the labor market effects of immigrants as well as arguments based on how education affects nativism. As noted previously, we include our measure of sociotropic effects, the change in the satisfaction with the national economy, to test arguments based on sociotropic effects.
We also include the number of foreign-born to examine two different hypotheses about how they could affect natives. First, the "conflict" or nativism hypothesis suggests that increases in the number of foreignborn leads to more conflict between natives and immigrants, leading to more nativism over time. The "contact" hypothesis, in contrast, suggests that increases in the number of foreign-born leads to more interaction and understanding between natives and immigrants, leading to less nativism. To test these alternative arguments, we include the percent of foreign-born, the change in the percent of foreign-born, and their interaction. 21 If increased immigration increases conflict, the sign on the coefficient should be negative; if increased immigration increases contact, the sign should be positive. Further, it could be that changes in the number of foreign-born have different effects depending on the number of immigrants already in residence.
To test the fiscal effects hypothesis, following Gordon Hanson, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew Slaughter (2007), we also include a measure of social spending in the state and fiscal exposure, the interaction of social spending and foreign-born. We also include standard controls. 22 We exclude variables, like industry, that have been found to have no effect on changes of immigration opinions.
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As the coefficients from an ordered probit can be hard to interpret, especially when there are interaction terms, Table 6 shows the predicted effects of the variables from Table 5 , Model 3. In each prediction, only the variable of interest was changed, and all other variables were held at their median value (for categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables). The predicted value then measures how the change in the variable of interest changes the probability of being in one of our three categories. Table A11 for full table. 22 Social spending data is from the Census of Governments (US Census Bureau 2012) and is total spending on education, public welfare, hospitals and health. 23 See online Appendix Table A15 for results on industry.
From the predicted probabilities, we find five main results. First, opinions on immigration are remarkably stable. Even during the huge economic shock that was the Great Recession, respondents do not change their opinion on immigration 54% of the time. Nonetheless, among those who did change their opinion, our economic perception variables and education do a relatively good job at explaining these changes; all of our variables that are statistically significant also have predicted probabilities of a change of at least 5%.
Second, the respondent's perception of how the recession was affecting his/her economic security directly influenced his/her immigration attitudes. The direction of the change in attitudes varied by type of immigrant. When respondents believed that their economic situation was getting better, they were more likely (12%) to support low-skill immigration and less likely (7%) to want to decrease immigration. Similarly, having fewer friends struggling because of the economy made respondents 5% less likely to decrease their support for immigration. On the other side, respondents who were satisfied with the economy, in general, were 8% more likely to increase their support for high-skill immigration and 12% less likely to decrease their support for immigration. Thus, changes in sociotropic views appear to change opinions on high-skill, but not low-skill, immigrants.
Third, educational attainment was a predictor of attitude change on high-skill immigrants but was less predictive of a change in attitude on lowskill immigrants. The "highly educated"-those with at least some collegewere about 5% more likely to increase their opposition and 6% less likely to increase their support for high-skill immigrants. Why? High-skill respondents viewed high-skill immigrants as economic threats. Once the recovery began, these attitudes returned quickly to precrisis levels, more quickly than did attitudes on low-skill immigration.
Is it possible that another factor, such as priming by elites or by the media, are driving the result that high-skill natives increasingly opposed high-skill immigration? We believe this is unlikely. Much of the rhetoric on high-skill immigration in the media and among politicians during the Great Recession and recovery was largely positive. For example, Thomas Friedman argued in an op-ed in February 2009, at the height of the recession, that immigration is the "cheapest and surest way to stimulate our economy," leading to more investment in start-ups, more patents, and helping to ease the housing crisis (2009). Similar sentiments were echoed in Congress. If priming by the media or by political elites was driving the results, we would have expected respondents to be more positively disposed to high-skill immigration as a way to stimulate the economy.
Fourth, as in previous studies, gender differences existed among respondents in the depth and speed of attitude change. Women were more likely to increase their opposition to low-skill immigration over this time period than did men even when we control for our economic threat variables.
Similarly, women, never as free trade oriented as men to begin with, continued to be less supportive of open trade as the economy failed. The gender difference remains a puzzle as to its origin. Fifth, we reject both the nativism and fiscal constraints hypotheses as explanations for a shift in attitudes.
These five results are consistent with change in opinion on immigration by country ( Table 7 ). Variables that capture the effects of the Great Recession on the family, the community, and the national economy as well as education levels had the most explanatory power. Variables, such as the percent of foreign-born or the size of the welfare state, had no statistically significant effect on these attitudes. Not surprising, respondents keyed in on different aspects of their perceived economic threat when evaluating immigrants from different areas. Family variables have the sign and significance that we hypothesize for immigrants from most states: Negative (positive) changes in economic perception lead to greater probability of a negative (positive) change in perception and vice versa. The exception is Mexico: Even those with positive changes in the perceptions of how the recession affected their family were still negatively disposed to Mexican immigration. What does seem to affect Mexican immigration is whether friends have been laid off. As the recovery continued in 2011 and 2012 and respondents had fewer friends laid off, they became more positive toward immigration. Table A16 for full models.
CONCLUSION
The Great Recession provided a unique period by which to investigate the extent to which economic variables explain attitudes to immigration and, relatedly, trade policy. By capturing views throughout the recession, we are able to capture small changes in attitudes, by a variety of categories: skill level, region, gender, and country of immigration. Our prior belief was that attitudes were affected by both a nativist sentiment as well as economic position; our design allowed us to separate out the two effects and focus on how economic hardship-that of respondents and that of others in their community-interacts with nativism and changes attitudes. In a sense, we see the recession as a "shock," and we are measuring how far attitudes shifted as economic variables changed. Instead of asking respondents to imagine a situation where immigration and/or trade openness threatens their jobs, we were able to tap public sentiment of those who did indeed suffer from job loss or feared a decline in work opportunities. To better understand the effect of the economic shock, we collected both "hard" data on salaries, employment, and the housing sector and subjective data on whether or not respondents felt they were suffering economic hardship. Our basic economic data allowed us to have more certainty than in previous survey analysis of the relative weight of economic versus cultural factors in immigration.
We can now summarize our data findings. Beginning with the prerecession survey results, we find that Americans have a baseline preference for some immigrants over others. They like immigrants who are high-skill and/or come from a country that sends many high-skill workers. Further, even among countries that send immigrants of similar skill levels-European countries, Canada, and India-our sample suggested that Americans still dislike immigrants who are more culturally dissimilar. This baseline preference is likely affected by immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and gender, as well as experiences from the past, such as education and cohort effects.
Second, both as a baseline finding and over time, an individual's support for immigration varies by his or her skill level. High-skill respondents were much more likely to increase their opposition to high-skill immigration during the Great Recession than were low-skill respondents. In contrast, lowskill respondents were equally likely to increase their opposition to low-skill immigrants as high-skill respondents. High-skill respondents were less likely to decrease their support for immigrants from countries that send low-skill immigrants than were low-skill respondents during the Great Recession. This suggests that education is measuring both tolerance and skill level.
Further, respondents varied in their level of anxiety as a result of the recession, and it was that anxiety, and not material conditions, that tracked with immigration attitudes. Those who felt more threatened by economic hard times were more likely to increase their opposition to immigration of all types. Since economic perception is not well predicted by variables that measure the actual economic situation, it is up to future research to better understand where these perceptions come from.
Fourth, we find scant support for much of the conventional wisdom that attitudes are a rational response to state spending. Even during a time of grave concern over deficits, changes in social spending did not affect opinions on immigration, nor did changes in the level of fiscal exposure. Likewise, changes in the number of immigrants did not affect opinions on immigration.
Our findings clarify three general beliefs in the literature on globalization and US attitudes. First, the public is far less critical of America's policy of open trade borders than is often portrayed in the popular press. During the recession, policymakers cast the fear that the Great Recession could parrot the Great Depression and lead to a re-enactment of high barriers to trade. Such an upswing in proprotection sentiment and thus policy never occurred. Support for trade openness, in part, may reflect how trade is portrayed by politicians and the media. Instead of being a source for job loss, trade liberalization is more often cited as a means to increase domestic jobs. Overall, we find more support for open markets for goods than for people. By using trade responses as a baseline comparison, we better understand that even though there is a component of immigration attitudes that is based on prior cultural beliefs, there is an important-and perhaps the most important-component of an individual's attitudes that is associated with economic position.
Second, there is no question that there is a nativist impulse in the American public. Cultural factors influence attitudes on immigration, and in particular, the public finds immigration from Mexico deeply problematic. These attitudes intensify when economic growth slows but also affect preferences even when there is no economic basis for anti-immigration attitudes.
Third, US attitudes toward globalization are more robust when global forces are not seen to impede economic well-being. Open markets for workers were less welcomed as the US economy faltered, but support for more open immigration returned with the recovery. There is a difference in economic policy preferences, however, even when policies are identical in terms of economic effect. Logic suggests that cheaper goods produced with foreign labor replace domestic unskilled labor, whether the product is produced in the United States or abroad. Yet, we do not see anti-trade attitudes of the same order as anti-unskilled labor attitudes. Immigrants are just more visible and the job loss more personal. Thus, while low-skill immigrants were problematic prerecession, all immigrants became a problem during the recession. It should be unsurprising that immigration reform has not been on the table again until recently, as the US public's tolerance for border liberalization evaporates when the economy is not producing jobs.
